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TEL. UNION v. C. & P. TEL. CO.
INTERPRETATION OF UNION-MANAGEMENT
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Maryland Tel. Union v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co.'
Plaintiff Union brought suit to compel the defendant
Company, under the "General Agreement" between the
parties, to arbitrate a series of grievances filed on behalf of
fifteen women operators, who upon return from pregnancy
leaves, were temporarily taken back as part-time employees
while other operators with less seniority were working
full-time. The Agreement contained provisions for nego-
tiation between the parties concerning layoff procedure
whenever in the Company's judgment there existed a
need for general layoffs or part-timing; and after specify-
ing a three-step grievance procedure, the contract limited
arbitration to unresolved disputes involving "the inter-
pretation or application of the terms of any provision of
this Agreement not specifically excluded from arbitra-
tion."2 After the instant grievances were processed with-
out resolution through the three-step grievance procedure,
the Union's request for arbitration was denied by the
Company. In seeking a decree to compel arbitration, the
Union contended that the Company's practice with respect
to these women operators was within and contrary to the
general layoff provisions. The Company argued that these
provisions could not be interpreted to apply to the in-
stant grievances, and hence the limited arbitration clause
was not applicable. The Company's more persuasive con-
tention was that since the Union had withdrawn its de-
mand for a guarantee of full reinstatement for employees
upon return from pregnancy leaves in exchange for the
Company's withdrawal of a "no strike" clause, the con-
tinuation of the Company's practice with respect to this
group of employees was not disputable and therefore not
subject to arbitration.
Judge Thomsen, relying on the principles recently an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in Steelworkers v. Warrior
and Gulf Co.' (hereinafter referred to as the Warrior and
Gulf Co. case) and Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.4
1187 F. Supp. 101 (Md. 1960).
' Id., 104. It was agreed that in the event of general layoffs or part-
timing the company would notify the Union and negotiate with them as
to the method to be employed. If no agreement were reached as to
method, the order of layoff was to be in the inverse order of seniority.
8363 U.S. 574 (1960).
'363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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(hereinafter referred to as the American Manufacturing
case), entered a decree compelling arbitration. As the basis
for its decision that the grievances were within the scope
of the Agreement, the Court quoted from the Warrior and
Gulf Co. case:
"Yet, to be consistent with congressional policy in
favor of settlement of disputes by the parties through
the machinery of arbitration, the judicial inquiry...
must be strictly confined to the question whether the
reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance.
. . .An order to arbitrate the particular grievance
should not be denied unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.'' s
The District Court found that it could not be said with
"positive assurance" that the arbitration clause could not
be interpreted to cover the instant grievances. Then, in
reviewing the Company's contention that this did not in-
volve a legitimate dispute because of the history of col-
lective bargaining between the parties, the Court quoted
the Supreme Court in the American Manufacturing case:
"The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the
merits of the grievance, considering whether there is
equity in a particular claim.... The processing of even
frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which
those who are not part of the plant environment may
be quite unaware."'
The Court concluded, with another quotation:
"... the reasonable course is to send all doubtful cases
to arbitration, reserving the right to vacate any award
which indisputably goes beyond the scope of the
agreement. '7
Section 301 (a) 8 of the Labor Management Relations
Act gave the federal courts jurisdiction over suits for
5 Supra, n. 3, 582-3.
6 Supra, n. 4, 568.
7 Cox, Ref letion8 Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1517
(1959).
861 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. (1956) § 185(a). Section 301(a)
provides that: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization . .. in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be
brought in any district court of the United States .... "
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violation of labor-management contracts in industries af-
fecting interstate commerce, but it was not until 1957
that the Supreme Court determined that under the Act
parties were entitled to specific performance of union-
management arbitration contracts.' In reaching this con-
clusion the Court said, "... the substantive law to apply
... is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the
policy of our national labor laws."'10 Since 1957 federal
courts have been faced with the dilemma of how to re-
solve the disparity between their traditional view of con-
tract law and the unique characteristics incident to col-
lective bargaining agreements."
A large majority of courts have been able to resolve this
dilemma when dealing with so-called general arbitration
agreements (in which parties agree to arbitrate all disputes
arising during the term of the contract irrespective of
whether the issues involved, are covered by the agreement),
recognizing that the wide scope of expressed intent therein,
combined with complexities inherent in collective bar-
gaining agreements, clearly warranted decrees enforcing
arbitration unless the area in dispute had been expressly
excluded from arbitration. 2 With the limited arbitration
agreements, confined to grievances involving "application
and interpretation" of the terms of the agreement, there
has been less uniformity. The approach of the majority
of lower federal courts18 has been to search for clear lan-
guage indicating that the parties had contracted to arfbitrate
the particular type of grievance under consideration. The
recently pronounced obligation of formulating federal sub-
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
10Id., 456.
"Cox, op. cit. 8upra, n. 7, stresses the conflict between the law of
ordinary contracts and Its application to collective bargaining agreements.
12 Butte Miners' Union No. 1 v. Anaconda Company, 159 F. Supp. 431
(Mont. 1958), aff'd, per curlam 267 F. 2d 940 (9th Cir. 1959); Signal-
Stat Corporation v. Local 475, etc., 235 F. 2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. den. 354 U.S. 911 (1957); Johnson & Johnson v. Textile Workers
Union, 184 F. Supp. 359 (N.J. 1960); Cuneo Eastern Press, Inc. of 'Pa.
v. Bookbinders & B.W.U., 176 F. Supp. 956 (E.D. Pa. 1959) ; Tenney En-
gineering, Inc. v. United Elec., R. & M. Wkrs., 174 F. Supp. 878 (N.J.
1959) ; Armstrong-Norwalk Rubber Corp. v. Local Union No. 283, 167 F.
Supp. 817 (Conn. 1958), app. dis. 269 F. 2d 618 (2d Cir. 1959). See also
24 A.L.R. 2d 752 (1960). But of. Dairy, Bakery & Food Wkrs. v. Grand
Rapids Milk Div., 160 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Mich. 1958).
'3Local 201, etc. v. General Electric Company, 262 F. 2d 265 (1st Cir.
1959); Refinery Employees Union v. Continental Oil Co., 268 F. 2d 447
(5th Cir. 1959) cert. den. 361 U*S. 896 (1959); Local No. 149, etc. v.
General Electric Company, 250 F. 2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957) cert. den. 356
U.S. 938 (1957); ISunnyvale Westinghouse S.E.A. v. Westinghouse E.
Corp., 175 F. Supp. 685 (W.D. Pa. 1959), aft'd. per curiam 276 F. 2d
927 (3rd Cir. 1960). See also 24 A.L.R. 2d 752 (1960).
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stantive law, the unfamiliar intricacies of these agree-
ments, and the courts' distrust of the competing self-
interests of the parties were in all probability factors which
played a role in the courts' reliance on traditional contract
law to solve the pre-arbitration disputes. The courts un-
doubtedly feared a more liberal interpretation for two
more cogent reasons: (1) a departure from principles of
contract law brings with it apprehension that parties
might be ordered to do what in fact they did not agree to;
(2) by turning over more cases to the arbitrators the courts
remove themselves from this area, thereby making it
difficult to establish a body of law for parties to rely
upon in formulating and operating under these agreements.
The textwriters have urged a more liberal approach to
interpretation of these agreements, asserting their unique-
ness14 and difference from ordinary contracts. Professor
Cox has stated:
".. . it is not unqualifiedly true that a collective-
bargaining agreement is simply a document by which
the union and employees have imposed upon, manage-
ment limited, express restrictions of its otherwise
absolute right to manage the enterprise, so that an
employee's claim must fail unless he can point to a
specific contract provision upon which the claim is
founded. There are too many people, too many prob-
lems, too many unforseeable contingencies to make
the words of the contract the exclusive source of
rights and duties."'15
Prior to the principles recently announced by the Supreme
Court, however, only a few lower federal court decisions"
reflected a more liberal interpretation of pre-arbitration
disputes based on the special qualities incident to such in-
struments. In the Warrior and Gulf Co. case," under an
arbitration agreement stipulating that disputes as to the
meaning and application of the contract as well as those
1, Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv. L.
Rev. 999, 1002-08 (1955), indicates that the collective bargaining agreement
is an instrument of self-government for an extended period of time; that it
deals with complex operations, vast numbers of people and problems,
areas of high tension between parties; -that the pressures for agreement
lead to compromises, purposeful ambiguities; that all contingencies cannot
be foreseen; and that still the contract must be brief and simple so as to
be understood by the employees.
11 Cox, op. cit. supra, n. 7, 1498-9.
"
6Local 1912, Int. Ass'n. of Mach. v. United States Potash Co., 270 F. 2d
496 (10th Cir. 1959), cert den. 363 U.S. 845 (1960); Local 205, United
Elec., R. & M. Wkre. v. General Elec. Co., 172 F. Supp. 53 (Mass. 1969).11363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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involving local trouble of any kind were subject to arbitra-
tion, while matters strictly the function of management
were not so subject, the union sought to compel arbitration
of the company's practice of contracting-out certain work
previously done by the union in spite of the fact that some
union members were laid off for lack of work. The com-
pany had been contracting-out for several years, and al-
though the union had sought to include a restriction, on this
practice, its attempts had been unsuccessful. The Fifth
Circuit denied the union's claim, and reasoning that the
company should not be compelled to artbitrate a matter that
the union had sought unsuccessfully to include in the con-
tract, found that the company's practice was strictly within
the function of management."8 The Supreme Court re-
versed, 9 Mr. Justice Whittaker dissenting,20 reasoning that
arbitration agreements were distinguishable from com-
mercial arbitration contracts, indeed from the law of
contracts:
"The collective bargaining agreement states the rights
and duties of the parties. It is more than a contract;
it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases
which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. . . . It
calls into being a new common law - the common
law of a particular industry or of a particular plant."'21
The Court added that the law which the arbitrator drew
upon was that of the particular industry's shop practice
which by implication was contained in the agreement,
thus making the experienced arbitrator more competent
than the courts to interpret the contract. The opinion
accordingly stated that "in the absence of any express
provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitra-
tion . . . only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to
exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail . *.. ,2
The Court reversed without discussing the question of what
emphasis should be given to the past collective bargaining
between the parties in negotiating the contract. The in-
stant case posed a similar problem since the union had
withdrawn their demand of job guarantees for employees
returning from leaves of absence in favor of the Company's
Is United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 269 F. 2d 633,
636-7 (5th Cir. 1959), rev'd. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
" Supra, n. 17.
2o Mr. Justice Whittaker refused to draw a distinctibn between collective
bargaining agreements and ordinary commercial arbitration contracts.
1 Supra, n. 17, 578-9.
SId., 584-5.
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withdrawal of a "no strike" clause. It would appear that
the Supreme Court in tacitly supporting arbitration on
points considered and abandoned during pre-agreement
collective bargaining has formulated a philosophy of in-
terpretation which recognizes these agreements as being
outside of contract law.
In the American Manufacturing case23 the Supreme
Court was confronted with a union claim for arbitration
under a limited arbitration agreement, where an injured
employee two weeks after receiving a workmen's com-
pensation settlement for 25% permanent partial disability
sought to return to his old job under a seniority provi-
sion in the Agreement. The Sixth Circuit, in dismissing the
claim, had held that even though the grievance was within
the scope of the contract, it was ". . . a frivolous, patently
baseless one, not subject to arbitration . . .",24 and
thus followed the doctrine first announced in Interna-
tional Association of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc.,25
whereby a grievance to be arbitrable must be a bona fide
dispute, susceptible to two reasonable interpretations. The
Supreme Court rejected this doctrine and reversed, again
asserting that these agreements were beyond the scope of
ordinary contract law,26 with the arbitrator, not the courts,
having the right to determine the merits of the grievance.
The issue of whether the Union's grievances were
meritorious, based on the history of collective-bargaining
between the parties, arose in the instant case, with Judge
Thomsen's decision, to refer this question to the arbitrator
being controlled by this principle.
In both the aforementioned Steelworkers' cases the
agreements contained "no strike" clauses with the Court
commenting in each that the arbitration agreement was
the quid pro quo for a no strike provision. The Contract in
the instant case did not contain a "no strike" clause, and
while it is possible that the Supreme Court might there-
fore be less liberal in interpreting such an agreement, the
concurring opinion, filed by Mr. Justice Brennan,27 to these
two Supreme Court cases indicated that the principles an-
2363 U.S. 564 (1960).
24 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F. 2d
624, 628 (6th Cir. 1959), rev'd. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
1271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 317, 318 (1947), aff'd., per curlam 74
N.E. 2d 464 (1947) (". .. the mere assertion by a party of a meaning of a
provision which is clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the words
cannot make an arbitrable issue."). See 24 A.L.R. 2d 752 (1952) for a
discussion of the Cutler-Hammer doctrine and cases.
Supra, n. 23, 567.
Id., 573.
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nounced by the Court did not appear contingent upon a
"no strike" clause.
The Supreme Court seems to have indicated that it in-
tends to support arbitration agreements wherever possible,
emphasizing that this is in conformity with national labor
law policy and thus discouraging recourse by the parties to
the courts at least until the grievance has been decided
upon by the arbitrators." The implication appears to be
that the Court has defined the judicial responsibility for
interpretation under Section 301(a) largely to post-
arbitration.29
THOMAS WAXTER, JR.
21 Id., 566, where the opinion states:
"Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
61 Stat. 154, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) states, 'Final adjustment by a method
agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the applica-
tion or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agree-
ment ... ' That policy can be effectuated only if the means chosen by
the parties for settlement of their differences under a collective bar-
gaining agreement is given full play."
2 Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), in upholding an
arbitrator's award of employee reinstatement where employees had been
wrongfully discharged, reasoned that the courts should refuse to review
the merits of an award 'but that if the arbitrator did not derive the
essence of the award from the agreement, the courts must refuse enforce-
ment of it
